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in Criminal Law.

By

-.

Holmes Reed.

Cornell University -

1895.

School of Law.

Insanity as a Defenge in

Criminal Law.

The great advancement which has been made by theo
scientists of our da7 in the study and treatment of
the alarming increase in

insanity;
malady;

prevalence of the

and especially the large number of important

criminal prosecutions in which the pla of insanity is
entered,unite to make our subject one which is not only
of considerable moment but of vital and absorbing interest.
in

Speaking generally, it may be said that insanity

some form has always been regarded by law as an ex-

cuse for the commission of crime.

Perhaps the earliest

common law case on the subject is that recorded in the
Year Book of 21st. year of Henry VII (1) where it is
simply said that "A man was arraigned for the murder of
a child, and it was found that at the time of the murder the felon was not of sane memory,
determined that he should go free,

by which it

was

quod nota bene".

But the difficult problem has been, to establish a test
by which we may determine what constitutes such insanity
as will, by law, exempt a criminal from punishment.
(2) To determine upon the amount of evidence necessary
to establish such insanity.

(1)

Y.

B.

21 11.

VII 31 b.

I. What is the legal test of insanity?
Upon the very threshold of the study of this
vexed question, it must be remembered that accurately
speaking, the insanity of a person is never at issue in
criniinal cases,

but only his Punishabilit.

As has

been said by another (D. B. Ogden in 11Am. L. Rev.

66)

"A nTwn maybe admittedly as mad as King Lear, and yet be,
in

the eyes of the law,

as amenable to punishment for

crimes not resulting from such madness as the most
clear-headed citizen of the land.
The earliest attempt to lay down a test for criminal responsibility was made by Lord Hale (1 11. p.
290).

C.

"There is a partial insanity", he said, "and a

total insanity, xxx and the partial insanity seems not
to excuse them in

the comnmitting of any offence in mat-

ters capital, for doubtless most persons that are felons
of themselves, and others, are under a degree of partial
insanity when they commit those offences xxxx.

Such

a person as laboring under melancholy distemper, hath
yet ordinarily as great understanding as a child of four-

teen years h~th,

is

such a person as may be guilty of a

felony or treason".
This test is doubtless a very vague one but it
has nevertheless exerted a considerable influence over

the subsequent development of the law.

At any rate it

affords a convenient starting point from which to trace
the variations of the law in the later cases.
In

the case of Edward Arnold (16 !low. St.

Trials

695) who was indicted in 1724 for an attempt to murder
Lord Onslow, the plea of insanity was entered as a defense and the rules laid down by Lord Hale w.,ere practically followed.

The prisoner was undoubtedly insane.

His habits were idle, irregular, and disordered.
Disregarding the entreaties of his friends, he lived
alone in a desolate, unfurnished house and had been in
the habit of lying about in barns and under hay ricks.
Ile was accustomed to curse and swear to himself for
hours at a time, would laugh wildly without any apparent
cause, and his sleep was troubled by fancied n6isess
and apparitions.

Among his other dolusions he believed

that Lord Onslow was the cause of all the tumults and
trouble that happened to the country and seemed to fancy
that he was the special object of his malevolence, declaring frequently that he sent his imps and devils
into the room at night.

And yet in spite of this

evidence he was found guilty, Mr. Justice Tracy instructing the jury that "It is not every kind of frantic humor
or something unaccountable in a man's action that points

him out to be such a mad man an is exempted from punishit must be a man that is totally deprived of his

ment;

understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is
doing, no more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild
beatt;

such a one is never the subject of punishment".

The theory which has been called by 14andsley the
"wild beast" theory seems to have been followed for
many years although the cases of Lord Ferrer decided in
1760 (19 How. St. Trials 866) and James Hatfield decided
in 1800 (27 How. St. Trials i82) indicate a tendency
toward a more humane test.

In the latter case, the

great Lord Erskinein arguing against the "wild beast"
theory said that "No such madness ever existed in the
world, that in all the cases the insane persons had not
only had the most perfect knowledge and recollection of
all the relations they stood in toward others, and of
the acts and circumstances of their lives but had in
general been remarkable for subtilty and accuteness and
that delusion, of which the criminal act in question
was the immediate, unqualified offspring, was the kind
of insanity which should rightly exempt from punishment.
Delusion where there is no frenzy or raving madness, is
the true characteriof'insanity".

The trial of this

case attracted a good deal of attention and seems to

have had a modifying influence upon the

Judicial minds.

Accordingly, twelve years later, in the case of
Billingham (5 C. 8 P.

108 Note

(a))

we find Lord

Mansfield declaring that the true test for determining
the prisoner's responsibility in the capability of distinguishing between right and wrong.
"It must be
all
proved beyond doubt," he says, "that at the time he
committed the atrocious act he did not consider that
murder was a crime against the laws of God and Nature."
These two cases were followed for several years,
although the law on the subject continued to be in an
unsettled and vacillating condition until the decision
in the famous T.c Naghton Case in 1843 (10 C. p F.

200).

Mc Naghton murdered one Druimond, under the delusion
that he was one of a band of conspirators whom he believed to be following him, blasting his character and
making his life

miserable.

There was very strong exp@rt

tds.timony'going to show that the knowledge of right and
wrong was not the true test of responsibility and despite the fact that he was able to transact business and
evinced no symptOms of mental disorder in his conduct;
he was acquitted on the ground of insanity.

The ver-

dict filled all England with indigrtion and alarm,
and raised a perfect storm of protest.

ft was finally

made a subject of debate in the House of Lords, and it
was there determined to state the opinion of the judges
on the law governing such cases.
propounded,

onlN. two of which,

Four questions were

however,

portance, namely the second and third.

are of great imThese are as

foll ows:
"2nd.

What are the proper questions to be submit-

ted to the jury, when a person alleged to be afflicted
with insane delusion respecting one or more particular
subjects or persons is

charged with the cotmmistion of a

crime (murder, for example), and insanity is set up
as a defense?"
"3rd.

In what terms ought the question to be left

to the jury as to the prisoner's state of mind when the
act wus committed?"
In

answering these questions, hr. Justice Mlaule

spoke for himself, but the court, through Lord Chief
Justice Tindal, said, "And as these two questions appear
to us to be more conveniently answered together, we
have to submit our opinion to be, tiat the jurors ought
to be told in all cases that every man is to be presumed
to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason
to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be
proved to their satisfaction;

and that to establish

inust be clearly

it

a defense on the ground of insanity,

proved that at the time of t'- e conmnitting; of the act,
of

the party accused aas laboring under such a defect
reason,

from desease of the inind as not to knowr the

nature and quality of the act he was doing;
did know it,

or if he

.ras Yrong."

he did not know that it

We have dwelt upon this case at, some length,
vause of its

be-

great influence upon the existing law.

The so-called "Knowledge of right and wrong" test laid
down by Tindal C. J.

as above,

has remained in England

practically unchanged, and is followed as well in most
of ou r American courts.
As early as 1851, only eight years after the decision in Mc Naghtons case, Mr. Justice Curtis of the
United States Circuit Court in Unit-ed States v lic Glue,
1 Curtis C.

C. 1,

declared the test to be "the capacity

to distinguish between right and wrong,
ticular act with which the accused is
understands the nature of his act;
to be criminal,

and that if

and deserve piunishvnent;

if

he does it

then,

in

as to the par-

charged.
he knoxs

If
'-is

he
act

he will do wrong

the judgement of the

law, he has a criminal intent and is not insane so as
to be exempt from responsibility.
if

On the other hand

he is under such delusion as not to understand the

nature of his act,

he has not sufficient memory

or if

and reason and judgement to know that he is doing wrong
or not sufficient conscience to discern that his act is
criminal and deserving punishment, he is not responsible."

This rule has been adopted in at least sixteen

of. the states,
M1issouri,

viz:

Tennessee,

California,
Texas,

New Jersey, 'Jisconsin,

Alabama,

Virginia, Lousiana,

North Carolina, Maine, Georgia, Mlississippi, Delaware,
and Nebraska (1).

In the New York case of Flannigan

vs People, 52 N. Y. 467, a strong effort was made to
change the test, but it was unsuccessful, the court declaring the rule as laid down in Mc Naghtons case to be
the settled law of the state.

And it may be added

that in the present Penal Code of this state the rule
remains unchanged.

In a few states however the test

has been considerable altered.

Thus, Judge Dillon of

Iowa in the case of Tetter vs State 25 Iowva 63 said"if by
the observation and concurrent testimony of medical
men who make the study of insanity a speciality,

it

should be definitely established to be true that there
is an unsound condition of the mind, that is
condition of the mind in

(1) See Art.

by lill

a deseased

which though a person knows

in 15 Am. Law fev.

that a given act is

wrong, he is

yet by an insane im-

pulse, that is an impulse proceeding from disease of the
mind,

irresistably driven to commit a crime, the law

must modify its ancient doctrine and recognize the truth
satisfactorily

and give to this condition, when it

is

shown to exist, its exculpation."

This is an admirable

statement of the so-called doctrine of uncontrollable
impulse and it

seems to us to be the doctrine which

should have been adopted in all American Courts.

It

has been adopted in Pennsylvania, Ohio, 11innesota,
Kentucky, and perhaps a few other states.

In Massachu-

setts the matter does not seem to be entirely clear for
although in the leading case of Commonwealth vs Rogers,
7 Ifetclaf 500, Chief Justice Shaw distinctly says that
a person acting in an "irresistable and uncontrollable
impulse" is not punishable for crime, a careful reading
of his opinion leaves one in considerable doubt as to
whether he really intended to recognize this doctrine.
The question as to whether or not an "uncontrollable
impulse" should be recognized by la'r as an excuse for
the commission of crime, has provoked endless discussion
and controversy, not only in the courts,
scientists and philanthropists.

but among

And it is at present

difficult to predict to what extent the more liberal

doctrine may in the future be adopted.

Both sides

have already received the support of many strong
authorities.

Gibbon, C. J. in charging the jury in

Commonwealth vs flosler, 4 Pa. St. 267, said "But there
is a moral or homicidal

insanity, consisting of an

irresistable inclination to kill or to commit some other
particular offense.

There may be an unseen ligament

pressing on the mind, drawing it to the consequences
which it sees, but cannot avoid, and placing it under
a coercion, which, while its results are clearly perceived, is incapable of resistance."

In Parsons vs

State, 81 Ala. 577, the court acknowledged that the
"right and wrong" test had been adopted by the state
but reopened the question and after thorough consideration held that "uncontrolIab2re impulse" should be a
defense, Somerville, J. declaring that the law had not
kept pace with the progress

of thought and discovery,

in the present advanced stages of medical science.
It cannot be denied that the above decisions are
in accord with modern scientific theories of insanity.
The capacity to distinguish between right and wrong,
whether abstractly or as applied to the particular act,
as a legal test of insanity and responsibility for
crime is repudiated by all modern authorities in medi-

cal jurisprudence.

Dr.

"With rega!'d to this

test"

says

Reynolds in his work on "The Scientific Value of the

Legal Tests of Insanity" on p. 54

"I may say, and most

emphatically, that it is utterly untrustworthy, because

untrue to the obvious facts of nature."
specialists have expressed similar views.

Other great
A striking

instance is found in the following Resolution unanimously passed at the Annual meeting of the British Association of medical officers of Asylums and Hospitals for
the Insane held July 14, 1864:
"Resolved that so:-ruch of the legal test of
the mental condition of an alleged criminal lunatic as
renders him a responsible agent, because he knows the
difference between right, and wrong,, is inconsistent
with the fact,,well known to every member of this meeting, .that the power of.distinguishing between right and
wrong exists very frequently in those who are undoubtedly insane, and is often associated with dangerous and
uncontrollable delusions."

(1)

iHor are the modern law writers backward in expressing disapproval of the old "right and wrong" test.

(1) see Ordronaux's "Judicial Aspects of Insanity" pp.
423 -

4.

Sir Fitzjaners Stephen in Vol.

II of his great History

of the Criminal Law of England at p.

108 says that

"it ought to be the law of England that no act is a
crime if

the person 41ho does it

is

at the time when

it is done prevented either by defective mental power
from controling his own conduct, unless the absence of
the power of control has been produced by his own default."

(I)

The theory of uncontrollable

impulse has also been

accepted in the Codes of several European countries.
The Criminal Code of Germany contains the following
provision,

which is

said to have been the formulated

result of a very able discussion both by the physicians
and lawyers of that country:

"There is no criminal act

when the actor at the time of the offense is

in a state

of unconsciousness or morbid disturbance of the mind,
through which the free determination of his will is
excluded."

(2)

It is provided in the code of France

that "There can be no crime or offence if the accused
was in

a state of madness at the time of the act."

(1)
See I Bisb. Cv. L. (7th. Ed.1) Sec. 386 et seq.
1 Whart Cr. Law (9th.Ed.) Sec. 45.
(2) Encyc. Brit. (9th. Ed.) Vol. 9 p. 112 citing
German Cr. Code (Sec. 51 R. G. B.)

and

At first the French courts were inclined to interpret
this law in such a manner as to follow in substance
the law of England.

But it is now construed in accord-

ance with the modern scientific view.
In spite of this great mass of testimony against
the old test, however, the m ajority of our courts as has
been seen still cling to it, and firmly refuse to
adopt the theory of"uncontrollable impulse."
vs Pagels, 92 Mo. 300, the court said:

In State

"It will be a

bad day for this state when uncontrollable impulse
shall dictate a rule of action to our courts."

In

State vs Mo'rey, 37 Kan. 369, the jury was directed that
"The law recognizes no form of insanity, although the
mental faculties may be destroyed or deranged, so long
as the person committing the crime knew what he was
doing and that the act was wrong."

The California

Supreme Court, in People vs loin, 62 Cal. 120, held
that an irresistible impulse to commit a criminal act
"does not absolve the actor, if at the time and in
respect to the act he had the power to distinguish between right and wrong."

Another very interesting case

is the recent one of State v. Harrison, 36 YT. Va. 729
decided in 1892.

The court reviews with great thor-

oughness the cases on both sides of the question and

concludes that the old test of "rigjht and w ong" is
best suited to the practical administration of justice, and as the safest rule for

9l.e protection of human life.

"This 'irresistible impulse' test has been only
recently presented" said Brannor, J.,

"and while it is

supported by plausible arguments, yet it is rather refined
and introduces what seems to me a useless element of
distinction for a test, and is misleading to juries,
and fraught with danger to human life, so much so that
even its advocates have warningly said it should be
very cautiously applied, and only in the clearest cases.
It will thus be seen that the opposition to this
new test does not arise from ignorance on the part of
our courts or from their inhumanity;

but because

they fear that its introduction would be' dangerous, and
tend to defeat the protection which the law af,nght
fords against the acts of criminals.

As Andrews, J.

said in the New York case of Flanagan vs People (Supra)
"Whatever medical or scientific authority there may be
for this view, it has not been accepted by courts of
law.

The vagueness and uncertainity of the inquiry

which would be opened and the manifest danger of introducing the limitation claimed into the rule of responsibility, in cases of crime, may well cause courts to

pause before assenting to it.

Indulgence in evil pas-

sions weaken the restraining power of the will and conscience;

and the rule suggested would be the cover for

the conission of crime and its justification.

1o

doubt but that there is great force in this argument
and it may be that the courts will cling to it for a
long time.

But as the theory which considers every

criminal tendency as a disease seems to grow in favor
among our scientists and is indeed rapidly gaining a
foothold in the popular mind, it may be expected that
the rule of punishability of insane criminals Trill gradually soften and in time willAthe point where the true
test will be - was the commission of the crime the result, in any way, of the pr-Isoner's insane delusion ?
There is no doubt in our own minds but that this is the
true test and it ought to be applied in our courts of
justice.

Ii.

hat is the rule of evidence as to the proof

of insanity ?
The consideration of ti'is part of our subject
involves almost as much difficulty A-s that of the first
one.

Of course the courts are more certain of their

ground and are not deceived and confused b:y any scientific theories, but nevertheless their disarreement

is just as marked.

And it may be premised that to ask

a jury comprised of men of only ordinary intelligence
and education, to detertmine whethqr or not certain
proved facts constitute insanity, seems rather strange.
Such a duty, it would seem could only be properly perBut such is

formed by experts in mental diseases.
universally the lar and moreover,

it

seeis on the whole

to work satisfactorily.
In their answer to the questions of the House of
Lords, the judges in 111c Naghton's case said that in
every case the jury should be told that every man is
to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient
degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes until
the contrary be proved to their satisfaction.

This

general rule is conceded by all courts but the difficulty is to determine where lies the burden of proof.
This question does not seem to have been mush discussed
in the earlier cases.

Lord Erskine, one of the

counsel in Hatfield's case (Supra) said in the course
of his opening address to the jury:

"The ,thole proof,

therefore, is undoubtedly cast on me."

Singularly

enough, howevei he voluntarily assumed a position more
difficult than the court desired to impose upon him for
Lord Kenyon said:

"His sanity must be made o%

to the

satisfaction of a moral !,inn, xxxx

,7,ct if

the scales

hang any thing like even,throwin" in a certain proportion of mercy to the party."

.ut history has

justified Lord Erskine, for it cannot be denied his
rule and not that stated by Lord Kenyon, is the law
in England today.
The cases on this question both in England and
America are almost numberless and it would profit little
to discuss them at any great length.

The different

rules of evidence which they support are these:
1.

Insanity must be proved by a preponderance of

evidence.
2.

Insanity must be proved beyond a reasonable

doubt.
3.

If any evidence of insanity is introduced,

the burden is on the plaintiff to show sanity by a preponderance of evidence.
The first of these rules depends upon the premise
that insanity is a simple question of fact to be proved
like any other fact and any evidence which reasonably
satisfies the jury that the accused was insane at the
time of committing the act,
an acquittal.

should be sufficient for

This view is taken by the United States

courts and by the courts of at least fourteen states

Massachusetts, Maine, Virginia, California,

viz:

Louisiana, Mlinnesota, Georgia, Iississippi, Alabama,
Ohio, Mlissouri,

Pennsylvania,

and Texas(l).

Delaware,

In some of these states however, the degree of proof
remains an unsettled question.
The second of these rules throws the burden of
proof upon the accused and in order to establish his
insanity and thus secure his acquittal it rests upon
the defendant to prove his insanity beyond a reasonable
doubt.

The theory of this rule wag that in asmuch as

the presumption of innocence attends the defendant on
trial and the state must prove his guilt beyond all
reasonable doubt and inasmuch as the general rule above
stated as to the presumption of sanity attends the case
of the state,

the same amount of evidence should be

brought before the jury to remove the presumption in
And as thfe state must es-

one case as in the other.

tablish the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable
doubt so the defendant must establish his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt if
plea.

he take advantage of tIhat

As was said b,, Chief Lust ice 'Hornblower in

State v Spenser, I

Abv.

196, "The proof of insanity at

the time of comitting the act ought to be as clear

(1) See Art.

of E.

B.

Hill in

15 Am.

L.

Rev.

at

.

727.

-nd satisfactory,

in

order to acquit him on +te ground

as the proof of corn:qitting the act ouiht

of insanity,

to *be in order to find a man guilty."

This rule is

in reality very weak and entirely without foundation.
The effect of the presumption in

favor of the innocence

of the defendant is to protect innocent persons from
If

punishment.

this be the object of the law it

cer-

tainly would not impose an equally heavy burden upon a
person who is

trying to prove that by reason of insanity

he was morally innocent of the crime.

The only state
Delaware

which has adopted this rule is New Jersey(!).
at one time was inclined to adopt it

but it

hs

since

refused to do so and now follows the first rule stated
above.

It

seems also that the state of Oregon has by

statute adopted this rule.
The third rule is the one that is most favorable
to the accused and it

rests upon the theory that a man

is presumed sane but when the question of his insanity
is raised and evidence is introduced to show that he
vras insane there rests with the nrosecution to sho.r that
the man was sane as a part of their case.

In fact it

becomes a part of their case and. the state must prove

(1)

State v Spenser I AabO. 196.

it

beyond all reasonable doubt like other facts of the
This rule has been accepted in how PTar-pnhire,

case.

Tennesee,

Nebraska,

2ichigan, New York,
It

Illinois,

Indiana,

and iorth Carolina

Kansas,

71entucl!y,

(1).
and

would thus appear that as between the first

third rules the states are very evenly divided.

Per-

haps a slight weight of authority favors t~he theory
that a defendant alleging insanity must prove it by a
preponderance of evidence.

The third rule which pro-

vides that whenever the jury has reasonable doubt of
sanity they should acquit the prisoner would seem to be
more in
law.

accord with the general principles of criminal
It

is

universally acknowledged that the true

rule is that where the jury has a reasonable doubt as
to a mans guilt it is their duty to acquit.
the person is

insane he morally is

But if

not guilty and there-

fore it clearly follows that a reasonable doubt of his
sanity is

in reality a reasonable doubt of his guilt

and should result in his acquittal.
This is

the reasoning which has been followed in

our own state of iew York.

(1)

it was said as early f

See Art. by Hill (Supra).

1857 in the lep~ain! case of "c Cann v People,
57, that "If

i,

I!. Y.

there should be a doubt about the killing,

all *rill concede that the prisoner is
benefit of it;

and if

there is

entitled to the

an:y doubt about will,

the faculty of the prisoner to discern between richt and
wrong,

why should be be deprived of the benefit of it,

when both this act and the will are necessary to make
out the crime."

This is

a most convincing argument

and although for sorie time the New YorkiCourts wavered,
they finally settled upon the rule under discussion.
And it should be noted that the New York Courts are so
liberal as to require only that the jury be plainly
instructed that a reasonable doubt in their minds upon
the question of insasnity entitles the prisoner to an
acquittal.

Nice distinctions in regard to the burden

of proof may be made, but are entirely unnec ssary.
Although,

as we have seen,

this

rule appeals very

strongly to our reason and sense of justice, it must

be admitted that in the light of general principles of
evidence and pleading it does not appear tc be logical.
The plea of insanity is not a traverse but a ples. of
confession; and avoidance.

One w-eho pleads insanity

to an indictment admits facts from wrhich malice is always,

if

there is

nothing more,

conclusively presumed,

but avoids the presumption by the fact of insanity,
and so denies the malice.
State v Lawrence 57

'e.

Ac Danforth J. puts it in

at 583,

the plea of insanity

"does not deny a sin9le allegation in ti
but simply says,
and still

indictment,

-rant all these allegations to bo true,

guilt does not follow, because the doer of

them is not responsible therefor.

It does not meet

an,, question propounded br the indictment,
one outside of it.

It is not a mere denial but a

positive allcration, xxxxx.
it

but raises

When insanity is found,

does not show that the act was any the lees wilful,

or deliberate, or even intentional;
an excuse,

but it does show

an irresponsibilit'y for what

wise been criminal.

'roull have other-

It would seem then, that the

question of insanity can never be raised, unless by the
prisoner;

and by him only in

such as carries .,rith it

an affirmative allegation,

thie burden of proof."

It

is

i!npossible to foretell which of theee two radically
conflicting rules will survive the test of time.
Indeed it

is

probable that both will find suiport until

the rising tide of popular and scientific opinion :,rears
away entirely the present theory of insanity as a
defense to crime, and lifts the unfortunate insane
criminal to a position where he will be safe from

23

the ignorance and prejudice
menaced.

,hyvih ich ne is

continually

